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Abstract Machine Learning (ML) and Deep Learn-
ing (DL) have been broadly used for building Intru-
sion Detection Systems (IDS). The continuing increase
in new unknown cyber-attacks requires corresponding
improvements to the performance of IDS solutions at
identifying new zero-day attacks. Therefore, the need
for robust IDS capable of flagging zero-day attacks is
emerging. Current outlier-based zero-day detection re-
search suffers from high false-negative rates, thus lim-
iting their use and performance. In this paper, an au-
toencoder implementation to detect zero-day attacks
is proposed. The aim is to build an IDS model with
high detection rate while keeping false-negative rate at
a minimal. Two mainstream IDS datasets are used for
evaluation—CICIDS2017 and NSL-KDD. To demon-
strate the efficiency of our model, we compare its results
against a state of the art One-Class Support Vector Ma-
chine (SVM). The manuscript highlights the efficiency
of One-Class SVM when zero-day attacks are distinctive
from normal behaviour. However, the proposed model
benefits greatly from the encoding-decoding capabilities
of autoencoders. The results show that autoencoders
are well-suited at detecting zero-day attacks, thus, miti-
gating their effect. The results reached a zero-day detec-
tion accuracy of [89% - 99%] for the NSL-KDD dataset
and [75% - 98%]% for the CICIDS2017 dataset. The re-
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sults demonstrate that the autoencoder performs better
when faced with complex zero-day attacks. Finally, the
trade-off between false-positive rate and detection ac-
curacy is also highlighted. The source code for building
and evaluating the proposed models will be made avail-
able through an open-source GitHub repository.
Keywords Autoencoder · Artificial Neural Network ·
One-Class Support Vector Machine · Intrusion
Detection · Zero-Day Attacks · CICIDS2017 · NSL-
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1 Introduction
Detecting zero-day attacks has been one of the main re-
search directions in the field of Intrusion Detection Sys-
tems (IDS) and Cybersecurity, tackling the exponential
rise in cyber-attacks [17, 14]. Machine Learning (ML)
techniques have been extensively utilised for designing
and building robust IDS [18, 13]. However, while cur-
rent IDS can achieve high detection accuracy for known
attacks, they often fail to detect new, zero-day, attacks.
This is due to the limitations of current IDS, which re-
lies on pre-defined patterns and signatures. Moreover,
current IDS suffer from high false-positive rates, thus
limiting the performance and the practical use of IDS in
real-life scenarios. As a result, zero-day attacks remain
undetected which escalate their consequences.
According to Chapman [6], a zero-day attack is de-
fined as “a traffic pattern of interest that in general
has no matching patterns in malware or attack detec-
tion elements in the network.”[6]. The implications of
zero-day attacks in real-world are discussed by Bilge
and Dumitras [3]. Their research focuses on studying
the impact zero-day attacks have and their predomi-
nance. The authors highlighted that zero-day attacks
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are more frequent than suspected, demonstrating that
out of their 18 analysed attacks, 11 were previously un-
known zero-day attacks [3]. Furthermore, their findings
showed that a zero-day attack can exist for a substan-
tial period of time (average of 10 months [3]) before
they are detected and can compromise systems during
that period. Moreover, The number of zero-day attacks
in 2019 exceeds the previous three years [22]. All these
considerations highlight the clear and urgent need for
more effective zero-day attack detection models.
One of the main research directions to detect zero-
day attacks relies on detecting outliers (i.e., instances/
occurrences that vary from benign traffic). However,
the main drawbacks of the available outlier-detection
based techniques is their relatively low accuracy rates
as a result of both high false-positive rates (which waste
the valuable time of cyber security operations centres)
and false-negative rates (which permit systems to be
compromised for prolonged periods of time). Ficke et
al. [10] emphasise the limitations that false-negative
could bring to IDS development, for example, it reduces
IDS effectiveness.
Sharma et al. [26] propose a framework to detect
zero-day attacks in Internet of Things (IoT) networks.
They rely on a distributed diagnosis system for zero-day
detection. Sun et al. [27] propose a Bayesian probabilis-
tic model to detect zero-day attack paths. The authors
visualised attacks in a graph-like structure and intro-
duced a prototype to identify zero-day attacks. Zhou
and Pezaros [35] evaluate six different supervised ML
techniques; using the CIC-AWS-2018 dataset. The au-
thors use decision tree, random forest, k-nearest neigh-
bour, multi-layer perceptron, quadratic discriminant anal-
ysis, and gaussian na¨ıve bayes classifiers. The authors
do not clarify how these supervised ML techniques are
trained on benign traffic solely to be utilised for un-
known attacks detection or how zero-day (previously
unseen) attacks are simulated and detected. Moreover,
transfer learning is used to detect zero-day attacks.
Zhao et al. [33] use transfer learning to map the connec-
tion between known and zero-day attacks [33]. Sameera
and Shashi [24] use deep transudative transfer learning
to detect zero-day attacks.
Furthermore, ML is used to address Zero-day mal-
ware detection. For example, Abri et al. evaluate the
effectiveness of using different ML techniques (Support
Vector Machine (SVM), Na¨ıve Bayes, Multi-Layer Per-
ceptron, Decision trees, k-Nearest Neighbour and Ran-
dom Forests) to detect zero-day malware [1], while Kim et
al. [19] proposes the use of Deep-Convolutional Gener-
ative Adversarial Network (DCGAN).
In this paper, we propose utilising the capabilities
of Deep Learning (DL) to serve the outlier detection
purpose of zero-day attacks while minimising the false-
positive rates. The ultimate goal is to build a lightweight
intrusion detection model that can detect new (unknown)
intrusions and zero-day attacks, with a high true posi-
tive rate and low false-positive rate while keeping false-
negative rates at an acceptable bound. Accordingly,
having a high detection capability of zero-day attacks
will, help reducing the complications and issues associ-
ated with new attacks.
The contributions of this work are twofold;
– Proposing a novel use for autoencoders as a zero-day
IDS.
– Comparing the performance of the One-Class SVM
model as an outlier-based detector to the proposed
Autoencoder model.
The rest of the paper is organised as follows; the
background is presented in Section 2, Section 3 lists
the used datasets and how zero-day attacks are simu-
lated. In Section 4, the proposed models are explained.
Section 5 presents the experimental results and the find-
ings. Finally, the paper is concluded in Section 6.
2 Background
In this section, the models utilised in this investigation
are discussed. Section 2.1 describes the deep-learning
based autoencoder model, and Section 2.2 describes
an unsupervised variant of a support vector machine
model.
2.1 Autoencoders
The model proposed in this manuscript principally ben-
efits from the autoencoder characteristics and attributes.
The objective is that the autoencoder acts as a light-
weight outlier detector which could then be used for
zero-day attacks detection as further discussed in Sec-
tion 4.1.
Autoencoders were first introduced by Rumelhart et
al. [23] to overcome the back propagation in unsuper-
vised context using the input as the target. As defined
by Goodfellow et al. [12], an Autoencoder is “a neural
network that is trained to attempt to copy its input to its
output” [12]. Figure 1 illustrates the basic architecture
of an autoencoder. The architecture of an autoencoder
and the number of hidden layers differ based on the
domain and the usage scenario.
Formally, given an input x, an autoencoder is trained
to minimise the reconstruction error, which is repre-
sented as the difference between x and x′ such that:
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Fig. 1: Autoencoder Architecture
x′ = g(f(x))
where f(x) is the encoding function, constructing the
encoded vector of x
g(x) is the decoding function, restoring x to its initial
value
The reconstruction error is defined by a function
that represents the difference between the input x and
the reconstructed input x′. Mean square error is one of
the functions that are used to calculate the reconstruc-
tion error as shown in equation 1.
MSE =
N∑
i=1
(x′ − x)2 (1)
Autoencoders were originally used for dimensional-
ity reduction and feature learning [16, 32]. However,
many other applications have been proposed recently.
These applications include; word semantics [21], image
compression [30], image anomaly detection [34], denois-
ing [9], and others.
2.2 One-Class SVM
The SVM is one of the most well-established supervised
ML techniques. Given the training samples, an SVM is
trained to construct a hyperplane in a high-dimensional
space that best separates the classes [8]. When data is
not linearly separable, a kernel is used to map the input
features/data to a higher dimensional space in which a
non-linear hyperplane would best separate the classes.
SVM kernels include; linear, polynomial, Gaussian, and
Radial Basis Function (RBF).
In contrast to its supervised counterpart, the One-
Class SVM is an unsupervised ML technique. It is de-
fined as a model capable of detecting “Novelty” [25].
The goal of One-Class SVM is to fit a hyperplane that
acts as a boundary which best includes all the train-
ing data and excludes any other data point. The result
of training a One-Class SVM is seen as a spherically
shaped boundary [29]. Since One-Class SVM is con-
sidered one of the most established outlier-based ML
technique, it provides an ideal comparison for assessing
the performance of a the deep neural network based
autoencoder.
Formally, given a class with instances {x1, ...., xN},
and a mapping function ϕ() that maps the features to
a space H, the goal of One-Class SVM is to fit a hyper-
plane Π in H that has the largest distance to the origin,
and all ϕ(xi) lie at the opposite side of hyper-plane to
the origin [31].
3 Datasets and Pre-possessing
Two mainstream IDS datasets are chosen to evaluate
the proposed models. The first is the CICIDS2017 dataset [5]
which is developed by the Canadian Institute for Cy-
bersecurity (CIC). The CICIDS2017 dataset covers a
wide range of recent insider and outsider attacks. It
comprises a diverse coverage of protocols and attacks
variations and finally, it is provided in a raw format
which enables researchers the flexibility of processing
the dataset. Therefore, the CICIDS2017 dataset is well-
suited for evaluating the proposed models.
The CICIDS2017 dataset is a recording of a 5-day
benign, insider and outsider attacks traffic. The recorded
PCAPs are made available. Table 1 summarises the
traffic recorded per day. The raw files of the CICIDS2017
dataset are pre-processed as described in the following
subsection.
Table 1: CICIDS2017 attacks
Day Traffic
Monday Benign
Tuesday SSH & FTP Brute Force
Wednesday DoS/DDoS & Heartbleed
Thursday
Web Attack (Brute Force, XSS, Sql
Injection) & Infiltration
Friday Botnet, Portscan & DDoS
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CICIDS2017 Pre-processing
Firstly, ‘.pcap’ files of the CICIDS2017 dataset are split
based on the attack type and the timestamps provided
by the dataset. This process results in a separate ‘.pcap’
file for each attack class. Secondly, the ‘.pcap’ files are
processed to generate bi-directional flows features. Thirdly,
features with high correlation are dropped to minimise
model instability. Algorithm 1 describes the process of
dropping highly correlated features. A threshold of ‘0.9’
is used. Features with correlation less than the thresh-
old are used for training. Finally, features are scaled us-
ing a Standard Scalar. It is important to mention that
only benign instances are used in selecting the features
and scaling to ensure zero influence of attack instance.
Algorithm 1 Drop correlated features
Input: Benign Data 2D Array, N, Correlation Threshold
Output: Benign Data 2D Array, Dropped Columns
1: correlation matrix← data.corr().abs()
2: upper matrix← correlation matrix[i, j]
{i, j ∈ N : i <= j}
3: dropped← i{i ∈ N :
correlation matrix[i,∗ ] > threshold}
4: data← data.drop columns(dropped)
5: return data, dropped
The second dataset is the NSL-KDD [4]. NSL-KDD
was released by the CIC to overcome the problems
of the KDD Cup’99 dataset [28]. The KDD Cup’99
dataset was the dataset of choice for evaluating more
than 50% of the past decade IDS [15], followed by the
NSL-KDD dataset which was used for evaluating over
17% of IDS. Consequently, NSL-KDD fits for the eval-
uation purpose of this manuscript, as well as the com-
parison with relevant research.
The NSL-KDD dataset covers normal/benign traf-
fic and 4 cyber-attack classes, namely, Denial of Ser-
vice (DoS), probing, Remote to Local (R2L), and User
to Root (U2R). The NSL-KDD dataset is available in
two files ‘KDDTrain+.csv’ and test file ‘KDDTest+.csv’.
Similar to the KDD Cup’99, the NSL-KDD dataset
is provided in comma separated values (csv) feature
files. Each instance is represented with its feature val-
ues alongside the class label. The feature files undergo
categorical features encoding to be appropriate for ML
usage.
As aforementioned, the goal is to train models using
benign traffic and evaluate their performance to detect
attacks. Therefore, normal/benign traffic solely is used
for training. The normal instances are divided into 75%
for training and 25% for testing/validation. Further-
more, each of the attack classes then mimics a zero-day
attack, thus assessing the ability of the model to detect
its abnormality. Since the NSL-KDD dataset is split
into training and testing, attacks in both files are used
for evaluation.
4 Proposed Models
In this section, the proposed models are explained show-
ing both the training and evaluation processes. Then,
Section 5 details the evaluation and results.
4.1 Autoencoder-based model
The building block for the proposed Autoencoder is an
Artificial Neural Network (ANN). For hyper-parameter
optimisation, random search [2] is used to select the ar-
chitecture of the network, number of epochs, and learn-
ing rate. Random search is known to converge faster
than grid search to a semi-optimal set of parameters.
It is also proved to be better than grid search when a
small number of parameters are needed [20]. Finally, it
limits the possibility of getting over-fitted parameters.
Once the hyper-parameters are investigated, the model
is trained as detailed in Algorithm 2. First, the benign
instances are split into 75%:25% for training and vali-
dation respectively. Then, the model is initialised using
the optimal ANN architecture (number of layers and
number of hidden neurons per layer). Finally, the model
is trained for n number of epochs. The loss and accu-
racy curves are observed to verify that the autoencoder
convergence.
Once the model converges, as rendered in Figure 2,
the model is evaluated using Algorithm 3. An attack
instance is flagged as a zero-day attack if the Mean
Squared Error (MSE) (recnstruction error) of the de-
coded (x′) and the original instance (x) is larger than a
given threshold. For the purpose of evaluation multiple
thresholds are assessed; 0.05, 0.1, 0.15. These thresh-
olds are chosen based on the value chosen by the ran-
dom search hyper-parameter optimisation. The thresh-
old plays an important role in deciding the value at
which an instance is considered a zero-day attack, i.e.,
what MSE between x′ and x is within the acceptable
range.
4.2 One-Class SVM based Model
One-Class SVM is trained using the benign instances.
In order to train the One-Class SVM, a ‘ν’ value was
specified. As defined by Chen et al.,“ν ∈ [0, 1] which
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Algorithm 2 Autoencoder Training
Input: benign data, ANN architecture, regularisa-
tion value, num epochs
Output: Trained Autoencoder
1: training = 75% i ∈ benign data
2: testing = benign data ∩ training
3: autoencoder ← build autoencoder(
ANN Architecture, regularisation value)
4: batch size← 1024
5: autoencoder.train(batch size, num epochs,
training, testing)
6: return autoencoder
Algorithm 3 Evaluation
Input: Trained Autoencoder, attack, thresholds
Output: Detection accuracies
1: detection accuracies← {}
2: predictions← model.predict(attack)
3: for th ∈ thresholds do
4: accuracy ←
(mse(predictions, attack) > th)/len(attack)
5: detection accuracies.add(threshold, accuracy)
6: end for
7: return detection accuracies
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Fig. 2: Autoencoder Convergence Curves
is the lower and upper bound on the number of exam-
ples that are support vectors and that lie on the wrong
side of the hyperplane, respectively.” [7]. The ν default
value is 0.5, which includes 50% of the training sam-
ple in the hyperplane. However, for the purpose of this
experiment, multiple ν values were chosen (0.2, 0.15,
0.1). These values were used to evaluate and assess the
autoencoder performance.
Algorithm 4 shows the process of training the One-
Class SVM mode. Similar to the model discussed in Sec-
tion 4.1, 75% of the benign samples are used to fit the
One-Class SVM model. Unlike the Autoencoder model,
where the evaluation relies on a threshold, a One-Class
SVM trained model outputs a binary value {0,1}. The
output represents whether an instance belongs to the
class to which the SVM is fit. Hence, each attack is
evaluated based on how many instances are predicted
with a ‘0’ SVM output.
Algorithm 4 One-Class SVM Model
Input: benign data, nu value
Output: Trained SVM
1: training = 75% i ∈ benign data
2: testing = benign data ∩ training
3: oneclasssvm← OneClassSVM(
nu value, ‘rbf ′)
4: oneclasssvm.fit(training)
5: return oneclasssvm
5 Experimental Results
5.1 CICIDS2017 Autoencoder Results
As aforementioned, 75% of the benign instances is used
to train the Autoencoder. The autoencoder optimised
architecture for the CICIDS2017 dataset is comprised
from an ANN network with 18 neurons in both the
input and the output layers and 3 hidden layers with
15, 9 , 15 neurons respectively. The optimal batch size is
1024. Other optimised parameters include mean square
error loss, L2 regularisation of 0.0001 and for 50 epochs.
Table 2 summarises the autoencoder accuracy of all
CICIDS2017 classes. It is crucial to note that accuracy
is defined differently for benign. Unlike attacks, for be-
nign class, the accuracy represents the rate of instances
not classified as zero-day (i.e. benign). By observing Ta-
ble 2, benign accuracy is 95.19%, 90.47% and 81.13%
for a threshold of 0.15, 0.1 and 0.05 respectively. More-
over, for the different attack detection accuracy, it is
observed that there are three categories. Firstly, at-
tacks that are very different from benign (for example,
Hulk and DDoS), the detection accuracy is high regard-
less the threshold [92% - 99%]. Secondly, classes that
are slightly different from benign (for example, SSH
Brute-force and Port scanning), an accuracy rise is ob-
served for lower thresholds. This emphasise the thresh-
old’s role. Thirdly, classes that are not distinguishable
from benign traffic, they are detected but with a lower
accuracy (for example, Botnet, SQL Injection and DoS-
SlowHTTPTest).
Figure 3 provides a visualisation of the different CI-
CIDS2017 classes and their corresponding detection ac-
curacies with different threshold values. By observing
Figure 3, different categories can be seen, (a) classes
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Table 2: CICIDS2017 Autoencoder Results
Class Accuracy
Threshold 0.15 0.1 0.05
Benign
(Validation)
95.19% 90.47% 81.13%
FTP Brute-force 5.34% 6.73% 82.82%
SSH Brute-force 8.38% 78.05% 80.51%
DoS (Slowloris) 71.73% 78.13% 80.85%
DoS (GoldenEye) 85.55% 87.71% 90.01%
DoS (Hulk) 98.23% 98.34% 98.43%
DoS
(SlowHTTPTest)
24.03% 28.09% 39.02%
DDoS 92.23% 97.88% 99.67%
Heartbleed 28.9% 39.6% 43.64%
Web BF 9.95% 82.04% 85.41%
Web XSS 11.28% 96.38% 99.46%
Web SQL 16.67% 22.22% 27.78%
Infiltration -
Dropbox 1
52.94% 94.12% 94.12%
Infiltration -
Dropbox 2
85.71% 100% 100%
Infiltration -
Dropbox 3
23.8% 89.5% 98.04%
Infiltration -
Cooldisk
51.92% 86.54% 92.31%
Botnet 17.77% 37.15% 66.88%
Portscan 28.37% 75.21% 98.47%
with a stable detection accuracy (i.e. line), and (b)
classes with a prompt rise in detection accuracy in the
right-most slice (0.05 threshold). Finally, the benign ac-
curacy (top left) falls within an acceptable range with
different thresholds.
5.2 CICIDS2017 One-Class SVM Results
Table 3 summarises the One-Class SVM results. By ob-
serving the One-Class SVM results, two assertions are
identified, (a) the detection accuracy is not affected sig-
nificantly by changing ν value, and (b) the classes with
high detection accuracy in the Autoencoder results (Ta-
ble 2 are also detected by the One-Class SVM; however,
the One-Class SVM fails to detect the two other cate-
gories (rise in detection accuracy with small thresholds
and low detection accuracy). This is due to the limita-
tions of the One-Class SVM algorithm which attempts
to fit a spherical hyperplane to separate benign class
from other classes, however, classes that fall into this
hyperplane will always be classified as benign/normal.
Table 3: CICIDS2017 One-Class SVM Results
Class Accuracy
ν 0.2 0.15 0.1
Benign
(Validation)
89.81% 84.84% 79.71%
FTP Bruteforce 10.19% 15.16% 20.29%
SSH Bruteforce 79.51% 80.26% 80.95%
DoS (Slowloris) 7.66% 8.38% 10.37%
DoS (GoldenEye) 71.87% 72.39% 72.85%
DoS (Hulk) 90.69% 91.35% 91.55%
DoS (Slowhttps) 98.59% 98.66% 98.71%
DDoS 39.35% 39.94% 40.96%
Heartbleed 99.49% 99.54% 99.58%
Web BF 21.1% 23.41% 35.84%
Web XSS 9.58% 9.76% 10.13%
Web SQL 5.77% 6.31% 6.85%
Infiltration -
Dropbox 1
38.89% 38.89% 38.89%
Infiltration -
Dropbox 2
29.41% 35.29% 35.29%
Infiltration -
Dropbox 3
57.14% 57.14% 57.14%
Infiltration -
Cooldisk
92.15% 93.8% 94.91%
Botnet 44.23% 46.15% 50%
PortScan 59.27% 60.04% 63.43%
This can further be visualised in Figure 4. One-Class
SVM is well suited for flagging recognisable zero-day at-
tacks. However, autoencoders are better suited for com-
plex zero-day attacks as the performance rank signifi-
cantly higher.
5.3 NSL-KDD Results
The autoencoder optimised architecture for the NSL-
KDD dataset is comprised from an ANN network with
122 neurons in both the input and output layers and
3 hidden layers with 100, 60, 100 neurons respectively.
The optimal batch size is 1024. Other optimised param-
eters include mean absolute error loss, L2 regularisation
of 0.001 and for 50 epochs.
Table 4 shows the autoencoder results for the NSL-
KDD dataset. As aforementioned, attacks in both the
KDDTrain+ and KDDTest+ files are used to evalu-
ate the model. Similar to the results discussed in Sec-
tion 5.1, the trade-off between the threshold choice and
the true negative rate is observed.
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Fig. 3: CICIDS2017 Autoencoder Results Summary Per Class
Table 4: NSL-KDD Autoencoder Results
Class Accuracy
Threshold 0.3 0.25 0.2
KDDTrain+.csv
Normal
(Validation)
78.81% 77.63% 78.81%
DoS 98.15% 98.16% 98.15%
Probe 99.89% 99.94% 99.89%
R2L 83.12% 96.48% 83.12%
U2R 84.62% 100% 84.62%
KDDTest+.csv
Normal 84.82% 84.42% 84.82%
DoS 94.67% 94.67% 94.67%
Probe 100% 100% 100%
R2L 95.95% 96.5% 95.95%
U2R 83.78% 89.19% 83.78%
Furthermore, compared to the only available au-
toencoder implementation detecting zero-day attacks
in the literature [11], the autoencoder proposed in this
manuscript largely outperforms the performances of [11].
The work proposed by Gharib et al. [11] uses a hybrid
two stage autoencoder to detect normal and abnormal
traffic. Training on KDDTrain+ file and testing on KD-
DTest+, the overall accuracy of their proposed model
is 90.17%, whereas the proposed autoencoder in this
manuscript the overall accuracy is 91.84%, 92.96% and
91.84% using a threshold of 0.3, 0.25 and 0.2 respec-
tively.
Table 5 summarises the NSL-KDD One-Class SVM
results. The results show a similar detection trend. This
is due to the limited number and variance of attacks
covered by the NSL-KDD dataset.
6 Conclusion and Future Work
The work presented in this manuscript proposes a new
outlier-based zero-day cyber-attacks detection. The main
goal was to develop an intelligent IDS model capable of
detecting zero-day cyber-attacks with a high detection
accuracy while overcoming the limitations of currently
available IDS. This manuscript purposes and evaluates
an autoencoder model to detect zero-day attacks. The
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Fig. 4: CICIDS2017 Autoencoder, One-Class SVM Comparison
idea is inspired by the encoding-decoding capability of
autoencoders.
Results show high detection accuracy for the au-
toencoder model for both the CICIDS2017 and the NSL-
KDD. The CICIDS2017 zero-day detection accuracy
reaches 90.01%, 98.43%, 98.47%, 99.67% for DoS (Gold-
enEye), DoS (Hulk), Port scanning and DDoS attacks.
Moreover, the NSL-KDD detection accuracy reached
92.96%, which outperforms the only available zero-day
autoencoder-based detection manuscript [11].
Furthermore, the autoencoder model is compared
to an unsupervised outlier-based ML technique; One-
Class SVM. One-Class SVM is a prominent unsuper-
vised ML technique that detects outliers. The one-class
SVM mode presents its effectiveness in detecting zero-
day attacks for NSL-KDD datasets and the distinctive
ones from the CICIDS2017 dataset. Compared to One-
Class SVM, autoencoder demonstrates its surpassing
detection accuracy. Furthermore, both models demon-
strate low false-positive rates. Future work involves eval-
uating the proposed models with datasets that cover
special purpose network IDS (e.g., IoT and Critical
Infrastructure networks), which will comprise insights
into adapting the proposed models, as well as, propos-
ing and adapting other ML techniques to use for zero-
day attack detection.
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U2R 78.38% 78.38% 83.78%
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